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Abstract
There is a large category of distributed systems that use component (e.g., process,
object) replication for availability. A large part of the effort involved in crafting these
systems lies in maintaining the cardinality of the set of replicas. For example in
primary-secondary replication, in the event that one component crashes, it is
necessary to create a replacement on some operational machine and hence maintain the
cardinality of the set of components to at least two. In systems where failed
components are recreated on other machines, the internal composition of the set of a
component group (referred to as a unit) may be seen to `walk’ over a number of
machines during normal system operation. We are interested in the problem of
recovery after a total failure of a unit (a disaster); that is, recovery after all or large
number of unit members have failed or partitioned such that the unit can no longer
function normally. Disaster recovery requires that once sufficient members belonging
to the unit have restarted or got reconnected, the unit should resume functioning
without further delay. A particular requirement is that only the components belonging
to the last unit configuration be part of the post-disaster unit configuration. This
paper presents an algorithm which a component can execute to determine whether it
belonged to the last unit configuration. The algorithm has been developed in the
context of an asynchronous distributed system where message delays are unknown
and therefore a slow component can appear as crashed or disconnected.
Key words: distributed systems, group membership, replication, total failure, failure
detection.
21. Introduction
There is a large category of distributed applications which use component replication
for availability (where a component is taken to mean any entity such as process, a
module or processor). A large part of the effort involved in crafting these systems lies
in maintaining the cardinality of the set of functioning components (referred to as a
unit)  to some fixed value. For example in primary secondary replication, the
behaviour for the system in the event that one component crashes is to create a
replacement and hence maintain the cardinality of the set to two. If the failed
component is a secondary, then it is replaced. In the event of a primary failing the
existing secondary is promoted to primary status and a new secondary created.
One particular problem in maintaining replica groups in the presence of member
failures is the danger of the so called split brain syndrome. If we consider the above
example of a primary secondary replication system, split brains can develop if a real
or virtual network partition forms between the unit members (a virtual partition could
occur in the presence of poor failure detection using inadequate time-outs). In such
situations both members of the group detect that a failure has occurred and act to
repopulate the group. The end result of which is two units now exist in the system
which has become inconsistent.
At run-time it is possible to avoid such problems by employing a ‘primary-partition’
group membership service in which the subgroup with a minority members do not
attempt to reform the group. In such a scheme when a membership change is detected,
the functioning components reassess their views. Components which belong to a view
with a majority of the components (the primary-partition) are free to create new
members and continue to function, members of the minority view suicide. In this
manner a partition or other failure can never lead to two versions of a unit being in
place at the same time. In systems with an even number of components such as the
primary secondary group mentioned previously, non-calculating members termed
ghosts or witnesses are introduced into the group to force a majority.
In this context we define a disaster (or a total failure) as  failures that leave a unit
without a subgroup with a majority of functioning components. In systems where
components may fail and be recreated in other places, the internal composition of the
set of a component group  may be seen to `walk’ over a number of machines during
normal system operation. We address the problem of maintaining the cardinality of a
unit in the context of the possibility of disasters and develop a post disaster recovery
technique that ensures that once sufficient number of components that belonged to the
last (pre-disaster) unit configuration have restarted, the unit should resume functioning
without further delay. Inevitably any solution to this problem will require that
sufficient pre-disaster unit configuration information survives disasters, and that this
information be available to components that are trying to determine whether they are
members of the unit. We have developed a distributed solution to disaster recovery in
which each member maintains its own unit configuration information (unit view)  on a
stable (disaster-proof) storage and executes a protocol using this view information.
It is tempting to conclude that our solution can be trivially implemented using any
primary-partition membership service reported in the literature. While such a service
is essential, recovery from a disaster is not trivial due to the fact that components
3have history information stored in their stable store (in the membership services
reported in the literature so far, no stable store is assumed). So, when they recover, it
is possible for two distinct sets to emerge, each attempting in isolation to configure
the unit. Fig. 1 illustrates a particular case. The initial configuration of the unit has the
primary on machine one, the secondary on machine two and the ghost on machine
three. All three group members have the view v={1,2,3} in stable storage.
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Figure 1: An example of the formation of split brains
In the second part of fig. 1, we show the actions taken by the unit upon the failure of
the ghost. The primary which is responsible for the creation of new unit members
detects the failure of the ghost. The primary creates a new ghost on machine four and
updates its own stable view to v={1,2,4}. The newly created ghost initializes its view
to the same.  At this point (before the secondary can update its stable view) the unit
suffers a disaster: all members fail. Now consider the behaviour of a simple recovery
strategy in which recovering components exchange view information with other
members of their views, and form a unit as soon as a majority are found to be
functioning. Assume that components have recovered but there is a partition which
separates machines one and four from machines two and three. When components one
and four recover they will exchange messages and agree to join. Since they form a
majority of the previous group they will reform the unit and recover their data. On the
other side of the partition components two and three, not able to contact component
one will also exchange messages and reform. A split brain has developed.
To avoid these problems it may seem sensible to require all group members to
exchange views and that all members of the group be present in order to proceed with
the reformation of the group. However it can be seen from the previous example that
component four will never receive the expected transmission from component two
(which has no knowledge of it). In a similar manner component three will block
forever awaiting a transmission from component one (which has `forgotten’ it). So
such a strategy will lead to deadlock.
Our solution consists of two parts: (i) a distributed membership service that is
responsible, in the absence of disasters, for maintaining the unit cardinality to a fixed
value and for maintaining membership views on stable stores; and (ii) a disaster
recovery algorithm that a component executes, using the view information on its stable
store, to determine whether it should continue to be a member of the unit.
4The membership service must meet the requirement that at most one version of the
unit should exist and the members of the existing unit should have the most recent
states. Meeting this requirement is particularly difficult in asynchronous systems
when failures cannot be detected accurately. It involves using a unique subset of
members, call it the primary-set, of the unit for keeping the cardinality at the desired
level in the face of actual or perceived failures of other components; these members
must cooperate with each other to detect and replace failed members in a uniform
manner. In the solution proposed here the primary-set is determined dynamically: any
subset of functioning and connected members can act as a primary-set, so long as they
are a majority within the unit. This majority requirement ensures that the primary-set,
if exists, is unique within the unit. When a combination of component and network
failures prevent the existence of the primary-set (a disaster has occurred), our solution
guarantees recovery from a disaster, when at least a majority of the members recover
and find themselves reachable.
The subject of disaster recovery of a (replica) group, although of great practical
importance, has not received much attention in the technical literature. Recent research
on group communication (e.g., [1,2,3] has concentrated on consistent failure detection,
maintaining consistent membership views and on ordered message delivery under the
assumption that total failures do not occur. Our membership service (the first part of
our solution) can be built by making use of any existing membership service that
provides (or can be adapted to provide) primary partition membership service, and is
a contribution in its own right as it describes how stable views of fixed cardinality can
be maintained. Our disaster recovery algorithm (the second part of our solution)
represents an improvement over the only published paper on this subject that we
know of [4]. Skeen characterised the problem of recovering from a total failure as
determining the last_set of processes that were the last ones to fail. In Skeen’s
protocol, for a process in the last_set to determine whether or not it is a last process,
it must wait for all other processes in the last_set to recover; whereas our protocol is
less blocking in nature, as it is normally enough for only a majority of ‘last’ to recover.
2. Assumptions, Definitions and System Properties
Components reside on nodes connected by a communication system. We assume an
asynchronous system where inter-component communication delays are not known.
A node and its components either work as specified or crash. A crashed node and its
components eventually recover. A component has access to a stable store where any
state information kept by the component remains unaffected by crashes of the
component. A recovering component can always access its stable store. Connected
nodes (components) can get disconnected due to real or virtual network partitions; a
virtual partition can occur due to network congestions and/or overloaded processors.
Disconnected nodes eventually get connected. Any two connected components are
delivered each other's messages in the sent order.
When a component p is a member of a unit U, it avails a local membership service
which replaces failed members of U with new members, thus maintaining the
cardinality of the membership of U to a fixed value n, n>2. Thus, p can see a sequence
of membership views for U installed over a period of time and we will number these
views sequentially as: viewp(x, U), viewp(x+1, U)  .. so on, where x, x ≥ 0, is a natural
number and viewp(x, U) is the view with which p joins U. Only the highest numbered
view installed is exposed to p and it is termed p's current view.
5The membership service also stores a local component’s current view in stable store.
A view can be one of two types: it is either complete or included. To avoid the kind of
split brains problem illustrated by the example of fig. 1, a view update on stable store
is done in two stages. The new view is initially of type included as it explicitly
identifies the members currently being included into the unit. A copy of this view,
with type as included is recorded in the stable store, overwriting the old (complete)
view; so a component keeps only one view on stable store. A requirement of the
membership service is that the included view contain at least (n+1)/2 members from
the old view. When the local membership service determines that at least (n+1)/2 old
members have recorded the included view in their respective stable stores, the
distinction between old and included members is removed, and the view becomes the
new complete view, and this change of type is recorded in the stable store, and the
component (p) is informed of the new view. Thus, the two-stage installation of a new
view is not be made visible to p which only keeps a copy of the latest complete view
in its volatile store. Fig. 2 illustrates the transitions of a view kept on stable store, in
which component 2 is being replaced by component 6.
Stable view View type Stage
v={1,2,3,4,5} COMPLETEold 0
v={1,»,3,4,5} INCLUDEDnew 1
v={1,6,3,4,5} COMPLETEnew 2
Figure 2: Two stage installation of new (complete) views
A component being included joins the unit and thus becomes a member, only when its
local membership service installs a complete view. (At this point, it is assumed that
the joined component has the most recent state; the actual technique used for
obtaining this state will not be of concern to us.) Thus, in an included view, joining
members (shown as circled in our notation) are not considered as members of the unit.
The predicates recordp(x, U) and installp(x, U) are true after included viewp(x, U) and
complete viewp(x, U) are stored in the stable store of p, respectively. A member
leaves the unit by mimicking its own failure. After leaving, it maintains no
membership view. Thus a component p is a member of U iff: for some x, x≥ 0,
viewp(x, U) ≠ { } and for some y, y≤ x, installp(y, U) is true. Note that this definition
disallows a joining component that has only recorded the initial view, to be called a
member*. The predicate member(p,U) is true while p remains a member of U.
We will define the xth unit view, view(x, U), as the union of viewp(x, U) of all p that
recorded or installed an xth view for unit U. (It will be empty if no member of U has
recorded or installed the xth view.)
Let C denote the set of components in the system. The unit view view(x, U) is said to
be unique, denoted as !view(x, U), iff any p that records (or installs) an xth view, is
guaranteed to record (or install) only view(x, U):
* A joining component installs its first view after it has, among other things, obtained the states from
existing members. Thus, installation of the first view  indicates a component's readiness to actively
function as a member.
6!view(x, U) ⇔ ∀p∈C: recordp(x, U)∨ installp(x, U) ⇒  viewp(x, U) = view(x, U).
Note that for any component q, q ∈  viewq(x, U). So, view(x, U) includes, by
definition, all members in the xth composition of the unit. If view(x, U) is unique, then
it contains no closed subset W in it: if the union of xth views of each process in W is
W, then W = view(x, U). Absence of any closed subset guarantees that there is only
one xth membership set for U and therefore no split brain.
We now formally state the two requirements the unit membership service must meet,
provided there are no disasters:
M1. ∀ x, x ≥ 0: view(x, U) ≠ { } ⇒  !view(x, U)∧  |view(x, U)| = n.
To ensure that component states are preserved across successive unit views, we
impose a correctness requirement:
M2. ∀ x: view(x, U) ≠ { } ∧  view(x+1, U) ≠ { }⇒  view(x, U) ∩ view(x+1, U) ≠ { }.
Next we focus our attention on disaster recovery and present the underlying
principles. A functioning member of a unit will be called active; an active component p
becomes passive when its membership service detects failures of (n+1)/2 or more
members in the current view or when its machine crashes. A passive member on a
functioning node eventually executes the (disaster) recovery protocol with an outcome
of either continuing or ceasing to be a unit member; it remains passive until the
execution of recovery protocol completes. A total failure or a disaster of U is a
sequence of events that lead to the system state in which no member of U is active.
This definition of a disaster allows the installation of initial views on potential
members prior to unit formation to be regarded as a disaster; our recovery protocol
can be used to form the unit, once the initial unit composition view(0, U) is installed
as the initial membership view on potential members. For uniformity, we will regard
unit formation as a special case of disaster recovery.
A member p is said to remove q from viewp(x-1, U) when it records viewp(x, U) for
some x > 0, such that q ∈ viewp(x-1, U)- viewp(x, U). If p removes r from viewp(x-1,
U) and if view(x, U) is unique, then r ∉ view(x, U); this means that r cannot install
viewr(x, U) and remove p from viewr(x-1, U). Thus, the remove relation is anti-
symmetric when unit-views are unique.
 A member component p is said to be a last member in view(x, U) if no member of U
removes p from its (x-1)th view. Informally, a last member in view(x, U) can be relied
upon to have the up-to-date unit state information to initiate the xth configuration of
the unit. Formally, p is said to be a last member in view(x, U) iff: member(p) ∧ p ∈
view(x, U) ∧ p ∈ viewq(x, U) for all q: p ∈ viewq(x-1, U) ∧  recordq(x, U). Let Lx be
the set of last members in view(x, U). When view(x, U) is unique, Lx is initially
view(x-1, U)∩view(x, U); this initial set of last members carry the most recent states
of components from the (x-1)th configuration of the unit to its xth configuration. If all
included components in view(x, U) eventually join (and thus become members) then
Lx = view(x, U). Thus, |Lx| ≥ (n+1)/2 if view(x, U) is unique.
Using the above concepts, we now state three disaster recovery properties of our
protocol (D1, D2, D3, see below). Let Rx be the set of all members that have so far
recorded or installed the xth view. If view(x, U) is unique, then Rx ⊆ Lx. (Note that a
7joining component that has only recorded view(x, U) is not counted as a member and
hence not in Rx, and that Rx does not contain those members in view(x-1, U)∩view(x,
U) that have not (yet) recorded view(x, U).) Let k be the largest number of the view
installed (not just recorded) by a member before a disaster occurs. Before the
occurrence of the disaster, if Rk+1 is not empty, it contains only the members that
have recorded view(k+1, U). Since no member records view(k+1, U) without installing
view(k, U), Rk+1 ⊆  Rk. Following a disaster, the disaster recovery protocol is
executed to form a unique 'primary-set’ of at least (n+1)/2 components in Lk, each
becoming active with an identical view and an identical view number, say s. The
members of this set then bring up the cardinality of the unit to n, if necessary by
including new components and installing a unique view(s+1, U). Since they are
members of Lk they will have the most recent states of components which can be
transferred to any components being included.
Formation of this primary-set is guaranteed, only if (i) view(k, U) is unique, and (ii)
there exists eventually a set M, M⊆ Lk, of at least (n+1)/2 functioning, passive
members that find themselves connected to each other. The requirement on M and the
relationship between s and k depend on the contents of members' stable store when
the disaster occurred and are listed below:
D1: if | Rk+1 |≥ (n+1)/2 then M must be a subset of Rk+1 and s = (k+1);
D2: if | Rk+1 | < n/2 and |Rk - Rk+1| ≥ (n+1)/2, then M must be a subset of (Rk -
Rk+1) and s = k; or
D3: if | Rk+1 | < n/2 and |Rk - Rk+1| < n/2, then M = view(k, U) and s = k.
For the case D1, the protocol will be less blocking for larger values of | Rk+1|. It will
be least blocking when | Rk+1 | = 0 and | Rk | = n (case D2); this will be the case when
a disaster occurs not because of crashes but due to virtual partitions. The last case is
the worst case scenario, where protocol  blocks until all members in view(k, U), i.e., all
last members in the last complete view, recover and get reconnected (this is the normal
case for Skeen’s protocol that does not optimise for cases D1 and D2).
3. Membership Service
In this section we will detail the membership service and the guarantees provided by
it. It consists of four modules, namely: failure suspector (FS), failure detector (FD),
view manager (VM) and view stabiliser (VS). FS suspects members in the current
view which appear to have crashed or disconnected and passes on its suspicions to
FD for confirmation. FD attempts to reach agreement on the reported suspicions with
the unsuspected processes in the view. Agreed suspicions are called 'detections' and
are passed to the VM module which replaces the detected processes with new
members and installs a new view with n members. As mentioned earlier, the
installation of a new view is done in two stages: the included view is recorded in stable
store and then sent to VS for completion; when (n+1)/2 old members in the included
view are known to have recorded it, VS informs VM of view completion. VM then
installs the complete view. Only complete views are visible to modules FS and FD.
Fig. 3 indicates the relationship between various modules. Of these modules, FS and
FD could be parts of an existing membership service; modules VM and VS are new.
8A component sending a message includes the current view number in the message. A
component only accepts a message coming from a member of its view and with the
same view number; any messages from a 'future' view are buffered for possible
delivery later on.
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Figure 3: Components of the Membership Service
3.1. Failure Detector
FD of member p (call it FDp) attempts to reach agreement over the suspicions
reported by FSp, with the unsuspected members in the view. (Agreement can be
reached symmetrically involving all FDs [e.g., [5, 6]] or asymmetrically by electing
one FD as the co-ordinator [e.g., 7].) Agreed suspicions become detections and the ids
of detected members are passed on to VM for replacement. We describe two
properties of FD (these can be met by many membership services published in the
literature).
We observe that detections are reported to VM in batches. The first batch of
detections is significant because as the detected members in that batch are replaced by
new members, the view changes - changing the domain of processes with which
agreement has to be reached and thus causing the second and subsequent batches of
detections to be re-agreed with the new members. With this in consideration, the FD
maintains, and shares with VM, the following two sets: detected, denoted as D, to
contain members detected to have failed in the current view and detected-first, denoted
as d, to contain the first set of detected processes after the current view was installed.
When VM installs a new view, it empties the sets D  and d; so, d contains the
members detected to have failed, when D was empty and D = d until a second set of
detection is made for a given current view.
To state the two properties of FD, we will use the temporal operators o and † to
mean "always" and "eventually", respectively. The predicate crash(p) is true while p
is crashed and active(p) is true when p is functioning as an active member. Further, we
will identify the sets maintained within the host node of a member process by
subscripting the set names with the member id. Finally, we will use dp(x) and Dp(x) to
denote respectively the sets d and D determined by p when viewp(x) was its current
view. dp(x) = Dp(x ) = {} if p does not detect any member when viewp(x) is its
current view which can happen if either p crashes or and no member ever suspects
any other member.
9FDP1: Two active members that have identical current view and never suspect each
other, will determine identical detected-first set:
o(active(p) ∧ active(q) ∧ p ∉ suspectedq ∧ q ∉ suspectedp) ∧ (viewp(x) =viewq(x))
∧ (dp(x)≠{} ∨ dq(x)≠{}) ⇒  dp(x)=dq(x).
The proof for FDP1 (in fact for a stronger version) is presented in [6]. Suppose that
viewp(x) is unique. Grouping members according to their detected-first sets, will divide
viewp(x) into disjoint subsets of agreeing members. Let the subset that contains p be
Wp(x): Wp(x)= {q∈viewp(x) | dp(x)=dq(x)}. Each process r in viewp(x)-Wp(x) is not in
agreement with p: either r is crashed or r has detected p (i.e., p∈ dr(x)). In either case,
eventually p detects r and r ∈Dp(z) for some z ≥ x. If |Wp(x)| < n/2, |viewp(x)-Wp(x)| ≥
(n+1)/2. So, if |Wp(x)| < n/2 and if p indefinitely postpones recording of the (x+1)th
view, then |Dp(x)| ≥ (n+1)/2. This property is necessary to ensure that viewp(x+1) is
also unique. Stated formally:
FDP2: |Wp(x)| < n/2  ∧ |dp(x)| < n/2 ⇒ (o(¬installp(x+1) ∧ ¬crash(p)) ⇒
†(|Dp(x)| ≥ (n+1)/2)).
3.2. View Manager
We will describe the algorithm of the view manager VM by supposing that VM at a
node has just installed a new (complete) view and set D and d to empty. Assume that
the local FD passes on a detection set d to the local VM and  |d| < n/2; the VM
identifies a set J, |J| = |d|, of spare nodes and sends an invite message invite(view, d , J)
to each of the identified spare nodes inviting them to join the group with an initial
view being (view -d)∪ J. (We assume the availability of spare nodes and also that
spares are uniquely ordered and the ordering is known to the members. Thus,
members that determine identical d will identify identical J.) If an invited node decides
to accept the invitation, it sends an accept message accept(view, d, J) to the VM of
each member in (view -d). When all the invited nodes accept the invitation, VM
records the included view, (view -d)∪ J, and prompts the view stabliser module (VS)
to complete the new view. When the VS returns completed(view -d)∪ J) message, it
installs the complete view and initialises D = D - d and d = { }. Note that if FD
module has reported more sets of detections in the mean time, D will not now be
empty. If D is non-empty, it instructs the FD and FS modules to treat the contents of
D as suspicions and reach fresh agreement with the processes in the new view (see fig.
3).
The set D may grow to be larger than n/2 while VM is awaiting either (i) VS to return
the completed message or (ii) each of the invited spares to return an accept message. In
both cases, VM switches the mode from active to passive, informs the application
process and modules FS, FD and VS of the mode change; the modules suspend their
activities after setting the variables they maintain to their initial values. The control is
then passed over to the recovery manager to construct a view for becoming active
again. The recovery protocol will then be executed using the included view in case of
(i) and the old complete view in case of (ii).
VM of an active component p may receive a recovery protocol message from a
process r, r ∈ viewp. (The local recovery manager is programmed to forward such
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messages to VM when the mode is active.) If r ∉ D, p informs the FS module to
suspect r. The event driven algorithm of VM is given below:
(i) 0 < |d| < n/2: send invite(view, d, J) to each process in J;
(ii) accept(view, d, J) message received from j ∈ J: deposit the received message in the
set acceptances; if (|acceptances| =  |d|) then {record the included view ((view -d)∪ J);
view_recorded = true; send to_complete((view -d)∪ J) message to VS;}
(iii) completed((view -d)∪ J) message received from VS: install the new view; D = D -
d; d = {}; If ( D ≠ {}) then {instruct FD and FS to renew agreement on D; D= {};}
(iv) |D| ≥ (n+1)/2: set mode = passive; d= D = { }; // recovery manager takes control
and FD, FS and VS suspend their activities //
(v) received recovery message from r, r ∈ viewp-D, via local recovery manager: force
FS to suspect r;
The VM of a spare node accepts an invite(view, d, J)) message only if at least
(|view|+1)/2 such messages have been received from distinct members in (view -d).
Before sending accept(view, d, J) messages, it creates a component locally, records the
included view ((view -d)∪  J), sets it mode (from spare) to joining and sends
to_complete((view -d)∪ J) message to VS. Note that joining may not get completed
due to an intervening disaster in which case the local recovery manager will set the
mode back to spare. The event driven algorithm for the VM of a joining process is:
(i) completed((view -d)∪ J) message received from VS: install the new view; set mode
= active; D = d = {};
(ii) mode = spare: discard the recorded view;
3.3 View Stabiliser
Upon receiving an included view, VS sends a message included(view) to all
components in its recorded view. It then waits to receive the included(view) message
from the VS of other members. It sends a message completed(view) to the local VM
and to all components in the included view, if it receives either at least (n-1)/2
included(view) messages or one completed(view) message. Thus, an included view gets
complete only when at least (n+1)/2 members have recorded the included view in their
stable store.
3.4. Membership Service Guarantees
We will now present the guarantees provided by the membership service when a
process p records or installs a new viewp(x+1):
MSP1: When p records (or installs) viewp(x+1), each q in viewp(x)∩ viewp(x+1), has
installed its xth view which is the same as viewp(x); that is,
recordp(x+1) ⇒∀ q∈ viewp(x)∩ viewp(x+1): installq(x) ∧  viewq(x) = viewp(x).
This guarantee follows from the facts that FDp has reached agreement with FDq in
detecting (viewp(x)-viewp(x+1)) and that only messages sent in the same current view
are delivered by components.
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A member p can record its (x+1)th view only after accept messages have been received
from all invited spares. So, the necessary condition for recording viewp(x+1) is:
|Wp(x)| ≥ (n+1)/2. The sufficient condition is: at least (n+1)/2 members in Wp(x)
remain active until they send invite(viewp(x), dp(x), J) messages to all |dp(x)| spare
nodes. The sufficient condition for installing viewp(x+1) is: at least (n+1)/2 members
in Wp(x) remain active until they  multicast the fact that they have recorded the
included view.
MSP2: When a process p records (or installs) viewp(x+1), each q in viewp(x)∩
viewp(x+1) that remains active will eventually record (or install) viewq(x+1) which is
the same as viewp(x+1):
recordp(x+1) ⇒ ∀q∈ viewp(x)∩ viewp(x+1): †((recordq(x+1) ∧ viewq(x+1) =
viewp(x+1))∨ (¬active(q))); and,
installp(x+1) ⇒ ∀q∈ viewp(x)∩ viewp(x+1): †((installq(x+1) ∧ viewq(x+1) =
viewp(x+1))∨ (¬active(q))).
MSP3: |viewp(x+1)-viewp(x)| < n/2.
MSP4: Let r be a member that has the same xth view as p but is not in the installed
viewp(x+1); since p installs its (x+1)th view, |Wr(x+1)| < n/2. So, no spare component
will accept any invite message that r sends. Thus, by FDP2, r eventually becomes
passive without ever recording an (x+1)th view:
∀r∈ viewp(x+1) - viewp(x): viewr(x) = viewp(x) ∧  installp(x+1) ⇒ †(¬active(r)) ∧
o(¬recordr(x+1)).
The last three properties guarantee M1 and M2 of section 2 in the absence of a
disaster:
!view(x) ∧  | view(x)| = n ∧  view(x+1)≠ {} ⇒  !view(x+1) ∧  | view(x+1)| = n ∧
view(x+1)∩ view(x)≥(n+1)/2.
4. Disaster recovery Protocol
When a member p becomes passive, the local recovery manager (call it RMp) executes
the recovery protocol to construct a view with which p can become active again.
During protocol execution, RMp works with the view, called the last view, that was
stored last in the stable store before p became passive. The last view can be a
complete or included view. If complete, it also represents the current view of p. RMp
contacts the members in the last view of p, and attempts to receive their last views.
This attempt will eventually succeed as crashed members recover and partitions heal
eventually. Based on the local last view and the received views, a view is decided
upon. If p is a member of the decided view, the decided view is stored as the current
view in the stable store and the mode is set to active; otherwise, the mode is set to
spare. The control is then passed on to the VMp. The recovery protocol executed by
the RM of a member component p consists of three phases: collection, decision, and
clean-up which are described next.
Collection Phase: In this phase, RMp disseminates its last view to, and collects the
last views from, components in its last view. It multicasts a view_message(last_view)
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containing its last view, last_view, to all components in the last_view. When it
receives a view_message(recd_view) from q that is a member in last_view, it enters
recd_view in a list of views called the view_list which will initially contain just the
last_view; any view_message received from a joining component in the last_view
(shown as circled members, see fig. 2), is ignored. When RMp receives a
view_message from RMr from r that is not in its last_view, it discards the message
but sends a view_message(last_view) to RMr. Note that p may be in r's view but p
may not have r in its view. There can be two reasons for this: (i) if the view number of
p's current view is smaller than that of r's current view, then p has been relatively
slow in updating its views; and (ii) if the view number of p's last view is larger than
that of r's last view, then p has removed r from one of its past views. By sending a
view_message(last_view) to RMr, RMp lets r decide which of these two conditions
holds.
Decision Phase: In this phase, RMp decides on a view. As each received view is
stored in the view_list, the following check is made: (i) if the received view represents
a complete version of an included view that is already in the view_list, then the
included view is promoted to be complete; or (ii) if the received view is an included
version of a complete view already stored in the view_list, then the received view is
promoted to be complete and then stored in the view_list.
RMp is able to decide on a view by inspecting its view_list if any one of the following
three conditions holds: (i) at least (n+1)/2 identical complete views are found in the
view_list, decision is made on that view; or (ii) at least (n+1)/2 identical included views
are found in the view_list, decision is made on that view, and the view is promoted to
complete; or (iii) view_list has no majority view and contains a view from each co-
member in the last view, then the last view is decided on, provided: the last view is
complete and p is present in all co-members' views; i.e. none of the co-members is
known to have removed p in the views they have sent. If none of the above holds,
then RMp must wait for some other component to make a decision and inform it (see
below).
Once a view is decided by an RM, it is stored in the stable store as the current view.
Then a message decided_msg(decd_view) containing the decided view, decd_view, is
multicast to all components in decd_view. Any remote RM that receives a
decided_msg(decd_view) message will decide on this view; the decided view is
disseminated to members in the current view. Note that the decd_view  in a
decided_msg(decd_view) message is always a complete view.
Clean-up Phase: The third and final phase is the clean up phase. Here a component
which has a decided view which was not the same as its current view, will examine the
decided view. If it is present as a member in the decided view, it will install the view
and become active again after diffusing the decided view. Components which find that
they no longer belong to the decided view will leave the unit.
In the recovery algorithm, a joining component only multicasts its (included) view and
decides only by receiving a decided_msg(decd_view); but otherwise it takes no part in
the decision process; only joined components are eligible to determine a decided view.
As stated earlier, when RMp receives a recovery protocol message when the mode is
active, it passes on the message to VMp. Below, we present the algorithm executed
by RMp when p is a member and the mode is passive. For this description, we
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assume a function maj(view_list) which returns the view that appears at least (n+1)/2
times in view_list, and two Boolean functions: full(view_list) returns true only when
there is a view present from every member in the last_view, a n d
IsComplete(last_view) returns true only when the last_view is complete. decided and
eligible are Boolean variables; decided is initialised to false and eligible indicates a
component's eligibility to decide on its last view if no view appears at least (n+1)/2
times in its view_list after full(view_list) has become true; eligible is initialised to false
if last_view is complete or to true otherwise. A set aliens is maintained to keep the
components that sent a view message but are not in the last_view. aliens and view_list
are initially empty.
decided := false; eligible := IsComplete(last_view);
multicast view_message(last_view) to all RMq, q ∈ last_view;
enter last_view in view_list;
while (not decided) do
{
received a view_message(recd_view) from RMq:
if (q ∈ last_view ∧ q is a member) then
{ enter recd_view in view_list;
 if (eligible) then
{eligible:= not(p ∉recd_view ∧ recd_view_no>last_view_no); }
∀view ∈ view_list do
if (view is included version of recd_view) then
{replace view by recd_view in view_list;}
od
if (∃ view ∈ view_list: view is complete version of recd_view)
then {replace recd_view by view in view_list;}
}
if (q ∈last_view ∧ q is not a member)
then {discard view_message;}
if (q ∉last_view)
then {unicast view_message(last_view) to RMq; enter q in aliens;}
received a decided_msg(decd_view) from RMq:
decided:=  true; decision:= decd_view;
if (decision ≠ last_view∧ p ∈ decision) then
{install(decision); mode := active;}
if (p ∉ decision) then {mode := spare;}
maj(view_list) ≠ {}:
decision := maj(view_list); decided := true;
if (decision is an included view) then
{decision := the complete version of decision;}
if (decision ≠ last_view ∧ p ∈ decision) then
{install(decision); mode := active; }
if (p ∉ decision) then {mode :=  spare;}
maj(view_list) = {} ∧ full(view_list):
if (eligible) then
{decided:= true; mode := active; decision :=  last_view;}
decided:
multicast decided_msg(decision) to all RMq, q∈last_view ∪ decision ∪ aliens;
} od // end of while (not decided) //
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4. Examples
In this section we will use various examples to demonstrate how the algorithm works.
In our example system we have a group of five components; Machines 1 to 5 each
with a single component on them with the last view v={C1,C2,C3,C4,C5}, each view is a
complete view (see fig. 4). In figs. 4, 5 and 6 we show how view transformations take
place as a component is replaced (there is no disaster).
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} 1
Figure 4: initial configuration
 We now assume that component 2 fails, and component 6 is to replace it. In the
following diagram each column shows the last view stored by each component as time
progresses. For example component one in fig. 5 updates its view from (1,2,3,4,5} to
the included view {1,»,3,4,5} in rows one and two of column one. Time increases
down the list, we refer to row 3 in fig. 5 as 5.3 in the example.
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} 1
{1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 2
{1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 3
{1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 4
Figure 5: Exclusion of a failed component
We define this series of view transitions as safe since if the whole group fails at any
point in stages 5.1…5.3 above, during recovery, at least one component is guaranteed
to form a majority of views with the content {1,2,3,4,5} and multicast that as the
decided view. At that point any member with the included view will recognise
component two, and component six will be told to become a spare. (If the system
suffers a disaster in phase 5.4 then at least one component is guaranteed to form a
decided view of {1,6,3,4,5} and component two will become a spare; in 5.4 above
component one will receive a majority of included views, dispatched by components
four and five.)
Fig. 6 below indicates further progression. Once a component has received a majority
of included messages it writes a complete view.
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
{1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 4
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 5
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 6
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 7
Figure 6: Including a new component
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Again we define this transition as safe since if the whole group fails at any point in
stages 6.5…6.7 every member (including component 2) that executes the protocol can
only decide on {1,6,3,4,5}.
We next consider some disaster recovery cases. In this case we choose a disaster
which occurred at stage 6.6 in the previous example. The initial system configuration
is shown in fig. 7.
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 6
Figure 7: Initial configuration
Since components recover and partitions heal at arbitrary times, members may receive
views at different times and in different orders. In this example recovery we show for
each component, the views received (without showing order). So for example if
component three has received a view from component two, then the stored view will
be shown in the second row of component three’s column.
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6 From
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} 1
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} 2
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} 3
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} 4
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 5
{1,»,3,4,5} 6
Figure 8: Initial message passing
Fig. 8 shows the state of the system after a number of view exchanges have occurred.
No component has yet received a majority of views with the same configuration so
the decision loop continues. Note how component five upon the receipt of a complete
view has promoted its own view.
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6 From
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} 1
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} 2
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} 3
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} 4
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} 5
{1,»,3,4,5} 6
Figure 9: The system after further message passing
Fig. 9 shows the state of the system after further processing. Here component one
receives an included view from component five. It promotes it to complete to match
its own view and stores it. Component five also receives a message from component
one and stores it. Both components see a majority of the group have the view
16
{1,6,3,4,5} and so multicast a decided view. Upon receipt of the decided view each
component multicasts the decided view to the members of its own stable view and
enters the clean up phase. Component two will receive the decided view from
component three, broadcast it and enter the clean up phase. Since it does not belong to
that group it becomes a spare. Component three when it enters the clean up phase will
recognize the addition of component six. At the end of the recovery phase the view
{1,6,3,4,5} will be decided.
We now consider a case when a disaster occurs in the disaster recovery phase of the
algorithm, and no component is able to form a majority of identical views. Suppose
that the system has begun replacing component two by component six, and that the
first disaster occurs after all but component 5 have installed the new complete or
included view. This is shown in fig. 10 below.
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6
{1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5}
{1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5}
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5}
Figure 10: System status  before the first disaster
During disaster recovery components one, three and four recover first and agree on the
last view as being {1,6,3,4,5}. At this point components five and six have not
recovered and so must be replaced by two new components, say, components seven
and eight. Fig. 11 below shows the state of the components after only components 1
and 3 have recorded the included view.
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6 Comp 7 Comp 8
{1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5}
{1,…,3,4,‰} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,…,3,4,‰} {1,6,3,4,5} {1,2,3,4,5} {1,»,3,4,5} {1,…,3,4,‰} {1,…,3,4,‰}
Figure 11: System status before the second disaster
If there is another disaster at this point no member will be able to form a majority
even if all the eight components recover and remain mutually reachable. Once
component 4 (which has the most recent complete view) has received views from all
its members, it will find that it has not been removed by any of these members in their
respective views, so component 4 decides on its view, and mulicasts it. Though
components 2 and 5 have complete views, they will find themselves removed by
components 1 and 3;  so, they will not decide on their own last views.
5. Correctness Arguments
In this section, we will sketch proofs to show that the recovery protocol assists meet
the unit requirements M1 and M2, in the presence of a disaster and with minimum
blocking. Let view(x), view(x+1), .. , view(l) be the non-empty sequence of unique
views installed between two successive disasters. (The first disaster recovery may be
the initial formation of the unit.) If no view is installed between two disasters (as in
the example of fig. 11), this would mean that the second disaster occurred 'too soon'
before recovery from the first could be achieved. We will ignore such cases as no
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mechanism can guarantee recovery from multiple disasters occurring too close to each
other. Given that a sufficient number of members in view(l) recover and get
reconnected before a third disaster occurs, the recovery protocol is shown to guarantee
that any p and q that decide for becoming active, do so on an identical view s, and that
any p that decides on a view, is a member of Ls. The membership service will then
ensure that the first and subsequent views installed after the second disaster are
unique and not disjoint. Finally, we will indicate that the recovery protocol can also be
used to form the unit with an identical, initial view.
Lemma 1: If view(x), view(x+1), .. , view(l) be the non-empty sequence of unique
views installed before a disaster, no member can decide on view(y), x≤ y < l, during the
execution of the recovery protocol.
Assume to the contrary that a member r decides on view(y). Either r received at least
(n+1)/2 messages with complete or included view(y), or it had (before the disaster)
complete view(y) as its last view and found no majority after receiving a view message
from each member in view(y). That view(y+1) has been installed by some component
before the disaster, means that at least (n+1)/2 members in view(y) has recorded
view(y+1), replacing view(y). Since view(y) is unique, less than n/2 components will
have view(y) as their last view while executing the recovery protocol. So, r could not
have decided on view(y) by receiving at least (n+1)/2 view messages with complete or
included view(y).
Say, r's last view before the disaster is the complete view(y). If r ∈ view(y+1) ∩
view(y), it would receive at least (n+1)/2 messages with complete or included
view(y+1) and decide on view(y+1). If r ∉ view(y+1) ∩ view(y), at least (n+1)/2
members in view(y) have removed r from their (y+1)th view; so, when r finds no
majority among the received views, it would find itself removed by some of its co-
members in view(y) and not decide on view(y). o
After the disaster, members of the primary-set M decide on the last view that was
installed or recorded by some member before the disaster. So, s has to be either l or
(l+1). Given the necessary conditions for deciding a view, there are three possible
types of pre-disaster situations to be considered:
(i) at least (n+1)/2 members have recorded view(l+1): | Rl+1 |≥ (n+1)/2;
(ii) the last view of at least (n+1)/2 members is (included or complete) view(l): |Rl -
Rl+1| ≥ (n+1)/2; or
(iii) neither view(l+1) nor view(l) is the last view for at least (n+1)/2 members: | Rl+1 |
< n/2 and |Rl - Rl+1| < n/2.
Since |view(l)| is n, the number of members that installed or recorded view(l) before the
disaster, can be at most n; i.e., | Rl |≤ n. So, |Rl - Rl+1| ≥ (n+1)/2 means that | Rl+1 |<
n/2. So, (i), (ii) and (iii) above are mutually exclusive. So, s will be (l+1), l, or l if the
pre-disaster situation is (i), (ii) or (iii) respectively, provided in case (iii) there exists a
member p that has complete view(l) as its current view and is not removed by any
member, i.e., p ∈ view(l) ∩view(l+1). This is guaranteed by the next lemma.
Lemma 2: When 0 < | Rl+1 | < n/2 and |Rl - Rl+1| < n/2, there exists a p, p ∈
view(l)∩view(l+1), with complete view(l) as its last (and also the current) view.
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Proof: view(l) is unique means that view(l+1) is also unique, and view(l) ∩view(l+1) ≥
(n+1)/2. 0 < | Rl |≤ n and |Rl - Rl+1| < n/2 imply that | Rl+1 | > 0. Since no member had
installed view(l+1) before the disaster, members that had recorded it must be in view(l)
∩view(l+1), i.e., Rl+1 ⊆ view(l) ∩view(l+1). Since some members had recorded
view(l+1), by MSP1, all members in view(l) ∩view(l+1) had installed view(l). Any p,
p ∈ view(l) ∩view(l+1) - Rl+1,would have complete view(l) as its current view, and
view(l) ∩view(l+1) - Rl+1 ≠ { } when | Rl+1 | < n/2. o
So, the protocol is deadlock free when sufficient number of members recover and get
reconnected. The primary set M formed by executing the recovery protocol is a
subset of Rl+1, Rl - Rl+1, or Rl if the pre-disaster situation is (i), (ii) or (iii)
respectively. So, M ⊆ Ls.
Once the initial unit view(0, U) is installed as the initial membership view on nodes of
components in view(0, U), the situation is the same as (ii) above with |Rl+1| = 0 and
|Rl| = n. Members can execute the recovery protocol to become active with s = 0 and
then form a unit of n members using the membership service.
6. Concluding Remarks
We summarise the previous work in this area and relate it to our work. The core
problem in recovering from a total failure is to determine the set of components that
were the last ones to fail. This problem was first addressed by Skeen [4 ]. In order to
define the set of last member processes to fail (call it ‘last’), it is necessary to define
‘failed-before’ relation over the set of processes. If p fails before q, then naturally, p
cannot be a member of the set ‘last’. Skeen identifies this relation to be an irreflexive,
antisymmetric and transitive binary relation which gives rise to a partial order on the
set of processes. Skeen begins with an assumption that failures can be accurately
detected and hence such an antisymmetric relation naturally exists. Research over the
past decade indicates that failures cannot be detected accurately in asynchronous
systems. In particular, if p detects q, it is possible in a partitionable system for q to
simultaneously detect q as failed. Antisymmetry can be achieved by introducing a
majority requirement in failure detection. When two processes ‘suspect’ each other,
the suspicion that is backed by a majority of operational processes becomes a
detection. Thus it is not possible for two operational processes to detect each other to
have failed. Membership protocols have been developed for providing this
functionality (e.g., [1,2,3, 5,6,7]).
Our solution consists of two parts: (i) a distributed membership service that is
responsible, in the absence of disasters, for maintaining the unit cardinality to a fixed
value and for maintaining membership views on stable stores; and (ii) a disaster
recovery algorithm that a component executes, using the view information on its stable
store, to determine whether it should continue to be a member of the unit. Our
membership service (the first part of our solution) can be built by making use of any
existing membership service that provides (or can be adapted to provide) primary
partition membership service, and is a contribution in its own right as it describes how
stable views of fixed cardinality can be maintained. Our disaster recovery algorithm
(the second part of our solution) is less blocking than that of Skeen. In Skeen’s
protocol, for a process in ‘last’ to determine whether or not it is a last process, it must
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wait for all other ‘last’ processes to recover; whereas in our protocol, that is not
normally necessary.
In a recent paper [8], Cristian describes group communication and membership
requirements for maintaining replicas consistent and state updating of joining
members. The approach presented in this paper can be integrated in such replicated
systems for providing the additional functionality of recoverability from group
failures. At the time of writing (Dec. 1996), we are implementing the protocols
described here in an existing replica management system of our industrial sponsor.
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